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JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-3-4(4) (Supp. 1989) provides 
that appeals from final orders of the district court come under 
SS 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3. Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) jurisdiction based 
on transfer from the Supreme Court depends initially on whether 
the case was properly before the Utah Supreme Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether a judge acts within his discretion in setting aside 
an extraordinary writ when 1) the writ is based on a petition 
that misstates or omits facts, 2) the writ seeks to order an 
agency to act in an area over which the agency has discretion to 
act, 3) the petitioners seeking the writ have not exhausted their 
administrative remedies, and 4) the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to issue the writ. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-6 (1989); 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 (1989); 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1989); 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-17 (1989); 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Johnson-Bowles, Inc. and Marlen V. Johnson are registered 
with the Utah Securities Division as Broker-Dealer and Agent, 
respectively. In January 1989, Johnson-Bowles sold-short shares 
1 
in a company called U.S.A. Medical, Inc. The price of the U.S.A. 
Medical stock thereafter rose dramatically in the over-the-
counter market. Johnson-Bowles, rather than pay the increased 
price to cover its short sales, began a campaign with securities 
regulators to convince these agencies to investigate for 
fraudulent practices in the trading of U.S.A. Medical stock. 
Failing that, Johnson-Bowles filed for injunctive relief in the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah and was 
granted a temporary restraining order. On March 1, 1989, Judge 
J. Thomas Greene found that the stock had been traded illegally 
as part of a fraudulent scheme and in violation of federal and 
state registration provisions, but refused to relieve Johnson-
Bowles of its obligations under its brokerage sales contracts. 
On March 1, 1989, the Utah Division of Securities ("the 
Securities Division"), armed with a copy of Judge Green's 
findings, and in order to protect Utah residents from unlawful 
distributions and fraud, issued an order suspending the 
availability of all exemptions under the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act for the offer or sale of U.S.A. Medical stock. That same 
day, a copy of the Division's Order was hand-delivered to 
Johnson-Bowles. 
By suspending sales, the Securities Division intended to 
halt manipulation and fraud in the sale of that stock in Utah. 
As a consequence of the March 1, 1989 Order, the price of U.S.A. 
Medical stock dropped dramatically. During the time that the 
Division's order was in place, Johnson-Bowles offered to purchase 
-2-
and did purchcise U.S.A. Medical stock from Utah citizens at the 
lower price in an attempt to cover its stock delivery obligations 
and extricate itself from a financial predicament. 
On April 27, 1989, upon discovery of the purchases, the 
Securities Division filed administrative proceedings against 
Johnson-Bowles and its principal, Marlen Johnson (appellants 
hereafter referred to collectively as "Johnson-Bowles"). The 
Securities Division sought to revoke or suspend their respective 
registrations. Among other charges, the Division alleged that 
Johnson-Bowles had engaged in "dishonest or unethical practices" 
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-6(1) (g) because the 
actions of Johnson-Bowles "in soliciting and/or purchasing the 
USA medical shares during the pendency of the Division's Order, 
encouraged or otherwise aided in the violation of Section 61-1-7 
of the Act."2 
Both Johnson and Johnson-Bowles were licensees of the Division. 
Johnson-Bowles also seeks to raise a plethora of substantive 
arguments in this appeal. One of these arguments is lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction or federal securities preemption 
under National Associtation of Securities Dealers rules. These 
arguments were addressed before the Securities Division, (R. 123-
125), and all can be addressed on review of the Division's final 
order. Nevertheless, the Securities Division has jurisdiction 
over the state licenses it grants to dealers. There is no 
question that Johnson-Bowles is subject to the Securities 
Division's jurisdiction. Section 61-1-6(1)(g) gives the Division 
jurisdiction to suspend or revoke a license for dishonest or 
unethical practices. 
2 
Section 7 of the Securites Act reads: "It is unlawful for any 
person to offer or sell any security in this state unless it is 
registered under this chapter or the security or transaction is 
exempted under Section 61-1-14." 
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Johnson-Bowles moved to dismiss under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The Administrative Law Judge 
(hereafter, "ALJ") held that Johnson-Bowles' conduct circumvented 
the Division's efforts to prevent trading and denied Johnson-
Bowles' motion to dismiss the dishonest and unethical practices 
claim. Johnson-Bowles requested that the ALJ certify his 
decision as a "final order" of the Division. The ALJ stated: 
"It is not within the province of this Court to decide whether 
the order set forth below is 'final', as to allow for subsequent 
judicial review, nor to certify any such order as being final for 
purposes of such review." (R. 16). 
On September 11, subsequent to the ALJ's denial of the 
motion to dismiss and before the ALJ had made findings of fact, 
conclusions of law or a recommendation to the Division with 
respect to license revocation, Johnson-Bowles filed under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 a Recjuest for Agency Review of the denial 
of its motion to dismiss. (R. 8-11). 
On September 26, 1989, the Securities Division filed its 
"Brief in Reply to Respondents Request for Agency Review and 
Hearing." (R. 120-134). The brief stated that agency review of 
the matter was discretionary and review of the interlocutory 
order was not the appropriate subject of review under the 
Administrative Procedures Act. 
On October 6, 1989, Johnson-Bowles also filed an additional 
reply brief in support of its Request for Review. (R. 78-88). 
•4-
On October 27, Johnson-Bowles filed its Petition in the 
Third District Court for an Ex Parte Extraordinary Writ. In its 
petition, Johnson-Bowles declared, "Since September 11, 1989, the 
date Petitioners filed their Requests for Agency Review or for 
Certification, Petitioners have heard nothing from either 
Respondent Baldwin or the Securities Advisory Board Member 
Respondents. Petitioners believe and allege that respondent 
Baldwin is deliberately or negligently stalling the disposition 
of Petitioners Request for Agency Review. . . ." (R. 4). 
Johnson-Bowies' Petition failed to point out that on 
September 26th the Division had filed a response to the Request 
for Review. Additionally, it failed to indicate that the Rules 
of the Department of Commerce allow the Division 20 days after 
the last responsive pleading before the Division need issue an 
3 
Order on Review. It failed to point out in the body of the 
4 
Petition that the last responsive pleading was filed by Johnson-
Bowles on October 6, 1989. It further failed to note that under 
an appropriate calculation of the timing of the issuance of the 
Order in Review, the Division need not have issued a response 
until October 27th, the very day upon which Johnson-Bowles 
3 
Rule R151-46b-12D of the Department reads as follows: "A 
written order on review shall issue within 20 days after the 
filing of any response or, if applicable, the submission of the 
matter after oral argument." 
4 
The body of the Petition mentions the existence of Johnson-
Bowies' reply brief without referring to the date of its filing: 
"Subsequently, Petitioners further filed a Reply Brief to their 
Request for Agency Review, a true and correct copy of which is 
attached hereto. . . . " (R. 4) The actual date of the filing of 
the Reply Brief would only be apparent to the Judge had he 
examined the copy of the brief attached to Johnson-Bowles' 
petition. 
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applied to the District Court for its Extraordinary Writ. 
Nevertheless, on October 27, 1989, Judge Sawaya granted 
Johnson-Bowles' Rule 65B(e) ex parte request for an Extraordinary 
Writ and Order. (R. 91-92). 
On October 30, 1989, the Division issued its Order on Agency 
Review, denying the Request for Review and refusing to certify 
the ALJ's order as final. Also on October 30, 1989, the Division 
received notice of Judge Sawaya's October 27th Extraordinary 
Writ. 
On November 1, 1989, the Division filed an Ex Parte Petition 
5 
under Rule 7(b)(2) to set aside the District Court's ex parte 
order. (R. 105-112). The Division's Petition argued that 
Johnson-Bowles had "hoodwinked" the judge into granting 
extraordinary relief by failing to disclose the matters cited in 
the preceding paragraphs. Additionally, the Division pointed out 
that review under the Department's rules of purely 
"interlocutory" orders would be inappropriate, and that the 
Division had in its October 30th Order refused to review the 
order of the ALJ because of its interlocutory nature. The 
Division attached a copy of that October 30th Order to its 
petition. 
Judge Sawaya granted the Division's request to set aside the 
previous order on November 1, 1989. (R. 103-04). Thereafter, 
Johnson-Bowles then asked Judge Sawaya to reinstate his writ of 
Rule 7(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in 
part, "Except as otherwise specifically provided by these rules, 
any order made without notice to the adverse party may be vacated 
or modified without notice by the judge who made it. . . ." 
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October 27. (R. 144-45). The request was denied. This appeal is 
based on Judge Sawaya's denial of Johnson-Bowles' request to 
reinstate. 
On August 13, 1990, following a full hearing before the 
Securities Advisory Board, the Securities Division issued its 
final order suspending the registration of Johnson and Johnson-
Bowles for one year. (See Appendix A). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Whether Johnson-Bowies' appeal should be granted depends on 
whether it was an abuse of discretion for the lower court to set 
aside an extraordinary writ of mandamus. This discretion vested 
in the lower court certainly includes the perogative to withdraw 
a writ when the initiating petition has clearly misled the court. 
Johnson-Bowles, in its petition for an extraordinary writ, 
by means of omitting to clearly state the relevant facts, law, 
and applicable rules, convinced the court below that the Division 
was not taking action on Johnson-Bowies' request for agency 
review. In fact, the Division had responded to Johnson-Bowles 
Request for Review, and Johnson-Bowles had replied to the 
response. There was nothing in the ordinary course of these 
pleadings to justify a writ in equity. 
Even assuming that Johnson-Bowles was entitled to agency 
review of the ALJ's order, Johnson-Bowles requested mandamus from 
the district court before the issuance of the Order on Review was 
required under Department Rules. 
7-
As a general principle, a court should not assume equity 
jurisdiction when administrative remedies are in progress. In 
the present case, administrative proceedings were in progress 
when Johnson-Bowles filed its petition for mandamus. Further, 
mandamus should not issue where the administrative body has 
discretion to act. The Director of the Securities Division has 
discretion to reviewing or not review interlocutory 
recommendations by administrative law judges. 
The Securities Division has discretion in determining 
whether to give agency review to Johnson-Bowies' claims. Section 
12 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act dictates the 
procedure for agency review. While the language of Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-12 allows a party to "seek review of an order by 
the agency," this does not mean that all orders are immediately 
reviewable under that section. "Order" in the section means 
"final order" by the agency head or one authorized to make such 
an order. Under the Utah Uniform Securities Act, only the 
Director of the Division, with the consent of the Advisory Board, 
may enter an order affecting the status of one of its 
registrants. The ALJ makes only recommended findings and 
recommended orders to the Division. These do not become orders 
of the Division unless they are adopted under Utah Code Ann. 
S 61-1-6. 
Furthermore, the ALJ's denial of a motion to dismiss is also 
not an "order" as contemplated by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12. A 
party wishing to dismiss a suspension/revocation proceeding has 
no right of immediate interlocutory appeal for administrative 
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review to the agency. If all litigants had an unfettered right 
to interlocutory appeals, then parties could cripple the 
administrative process by appealing at every stage of the 
proceedings. 
This case is not properly before the court because there is 
no "order" to which the party can request review. The ALJ's 
denial of the motion to dismiss was subject only to discretionary 
review by the Division because the ALJ had not submitted a final 
recommendation. Because this was a formal adjudicative 
proceeding, initial judicial review of the interlocutory 
proceeding, if available at all, would have only been proper 
before the Court of Appeals, And, even though jurisdiction 
might have been proper in the Court of Appeals, there are valid 
policy reasons for leaving review of ALJ interlocutory 
recommendations to the discretion of the agency head. 
The question of whether this court should order the lower 
court to reinstate the Extraordinary Writ is now moot owing to 
the Division's entry of its final order on August 13, 1990. 
Finally, Rule 33 damages are appropriate. The issues 
Johnson-Bowles sought to raise below were not ripe for review. 
The entry of the Extraordinary Writ was predicated upon erroneous 
information provided by Johnson-Bowles ex parte. When the court 
below was adequately apprised of the true facts, law and 
governing rules, the court appropriately set aside its order and 
rightly refused to reinstate. The appeal is frivolous because it 
lacks any substantive foundation in fact or law and the issue it 
deals with, whether this court should order the lower court to 
-9-
reinstate its order is entirely moot at this point in these 
proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A Judge Has Discretion in Determining Whether a Writ of 
Mandamus Should Issue, and Writs of Mandamus Do Not Issue Where 
the Government Entity has Discretion to Act 
A. Standard of Review 
A judge has discretion to grant or deny extraordinary writs 
of mandamus, and the decision will be sustained unless there is 
an abuse of that discretion. Garcia v. South Tucson, 135 Ariz. 
604, 663 P.2d 596, 598 (Ct. App. 1983); Cain v. Dept. of Health, 
582 P.2d 332, 334 (Mont. 1978). Therefore, this Court should 
uphold Judge Sawaya's decision not to reinstate the extraordinary 
writ unless this Court finds such action is an abuse of 
discretion. 
B. The District Court Lacked Equity Jurisdiction Because 
Johnson-Bowles Had Not Exhausted its Administrative Remedies 
As its name indicates, an extraordinary writ does not issue 
in ordinary circumstances. Mandamus, therefore, should not issue 
before the exhaustion of administrative remedies, in the ordinary 
course of administrative proceedings. Levie v. Sevier County, 
617 P.2d 331, 332 n.l (Utah 1980). A party cannot expect a trial 
court to exercise equity jurisdiction when that party has failed 
to pursue adequate and available administrative remedies. All 
Purpose Vending, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 561 A.2d 1309, 1311 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1989). Additionally, a writ cannot be used as an 
alternative way to appeal administrative decisions. Merrihew v. 
Salt Lake County Planning, 659 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 1983). 
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In Merrihew v. Salt Lake County, the Planning Commission 
revoked Merrihewrs building permit. Merrihew did not appeal the 
revocation. Instead he asked the District Court for an 
extraordinary writ to require the Planning Commission to 
reinstate his permit. On appeal the Utah Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its position that parties must exhaust administrative 
remedies as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review. J^ i. This 
approach is consistent with the basic principles underlying the 
writ of mandamus, namely: "[It] is not for the courts to intrude 
into or interfere with the functions or the policies of other 
departments of government." Wright Development v. City of 
Wellsville, 608 P.2d 232, 233 (Utah 1980). 
Johnson-Bowles sought reversal of the ALJ's denial of 
Johnson-Bowles' motion to dismiss. It filed a Request for Agency 
Review under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 and Department Rule R151-
46b-12. The record demonstrates that while this review process 
was still under way, Johnson-Bowles sought recourse in state 
court by asking the court to issue an extraordinary writ to 
compel the Securities Board or Securities Director to take action 
on the motion to dismiss. The Record is clear that the last 
responsive pleading filed in the matter was Johnson-Bowies' 
Reply, submitted to the Division, October 6, 1990. Even assuming 
the Securities Division was obligated to review the decision, 
which obligation was contested in the Division's responsive 
brief, under Utah Admin. Code R151-46b-12D., the Securities 
Division had until October 27, 1989 to issue its written order. 
See supra note 3. 
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However, that was precisely the day that Johnson-Bowles, not 
willing to wait for the Division's decision, and without notice 
to the Division, convinced the lower court to issue its writ. 
Therefore, the Petition for the Extraordinary Writ was an attempt 
to circumvent the exhaustion of administrative remedies 
requirement and judicial review by going to the courts for a writ 
of mandamus. 
Johnson-Bowles relies heavily on Alcoa v. ICC, 761 F.2d 746 
(D.C. Cir. 1985), to support its claim that the proper remedy is 
a writ of mandamus to the administrative agency. In Alcoa, an 
administrative law judge with the ICC dismissed a shipper's 
complaint. Railroad companies appealed the commission's adoption 
of the ALJ decision. The Interstate Commerce Act required that 
the ICC make a final decision on the appeal within 180 days. 
Alcoa is inapposite to the issues raised in this appeal. 
First, in Alcoa the ICC fully dismissed the case. A summary 
disposition of the proceedings is final action. Here, by denying 
the motion to dismiss, the ALJ continued the proceedings. 
Second, in Alcoa, a statutory 180-day period was running. Id. at 
748. And, by statute, the ALJ's decision in that case became the 
decision of the ICC when the ICC did not complete its review 
within the 180-day period. In this case, the ALJ's order at best 
was of an interlocutory nature, not disposing of the action. 
Therefore, Appellants' reliance on the Alcoa case is misplaced. 
12-
C. An Extraordinary Writ Should Not Issue to Force a State 
Agency to Take an Action or Make a Decision that is in Its 
Discretion 
1. Mandamus should not direct performance of 
discretionary duties 
Mandamus should not issue against government agencies to 
force them to make decisions or to take actions which are within 
their discretion. Rule 65B(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides for the issuance of an extraordinary writ 
where an officer, exercising judicial functions abuses the 
discretion of that function. If an act is discretionary, 
mandamus does not lie. Ingram-Clevenger, Inc. v. Lewis & Clark 
County, 636 P.2d 1372, 1374 (Mont. 1981). Mandamus should not 
issue to compel a public official with discretion to act in a 
certain way. Olson v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 724 P.2d 960, 
967 (Utah 1986). Only when a public official has exceeded the 
boundaries of the discretion may a writ of mandamus be granted. 
Id. In this case, Appellants did not show at any stage of the 
proceedings leading to this appeal that the Director had exceeded 
the boundaries of his discretion, nor could they because, again, 
the time for the Division to issue its order on review had not 
run. 
2. The Securities Division has the Discretion to 
Review the Interlocutory Decisions of Its 
Administrative Law Judges 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-l, et seq. (1989) (hereafter,"UAPA") provides two levels of 
appeal from an ALJ's decision. Administrative review is through 
§§ 12 and 13, and judicial review comes via § 14. Judicial 
review under S 14 is not at issue here, as § 14 deals with review 
13-
by a state court of a final agency action. Though the pleadings 
in the court below are packed with arguments on the merits of 
Johnson-Bowies' arguments to dismiss, as is its Appellant's 
Brief, Judge Sawaya was asked to issue a writ, not to review the 
agency's decision. Sections 12 and 13 do not apply here either 
because both contemplate final agency action. 
a. Section 12 of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act Only Provides for Review of 
"Final," not "Interlocutory" Orders. 
Sections 12 and 13 of the UAPA provide for two mutually 
exclusive means of review at the agency level. Section 12, 
agency review, governs review of a final order to a higher level 
within the agency. Section 13, reconsideration, governs review 
of a final order when there is no higher level within the agency 
to review the decision. 
Section 12 of the UAPA provides a procedure for agency 
review of a final adjudicative proceeding. However, it is clear 
that the review is conditional: 
If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any 
adjudicative proceeding to seek review of an order by the 
agency . . . the aggrieved party may file a written request 
for review. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12(l)(a) (1989). The Department of 
Business Regulation has promulgated rules consistent with section 
12 which allow a request for agency review. However, the term 
"order" in this context, does not include an order of the type 
issued by the ALJ in this case. Though the ALJ employed the term 
"order" in his ruling, the ruling amounts to a refusal to 
recommend to the agency head a dismissal of the charges. No 
14 
action of the agency is an order of the agency without adoption 
by the Director and the Securities Advisory Board under Utah Code 
Ann. S 61-1-6.7 
A logical construction of the language of the Department's 
Rules compels this conclusion as well. Utah Admin. Code R151-
46b-12B, provides that "the effective date of the previously 
issued order shall be suspended until ten days after the order on 
review has been mailed to all parties." This language 
contemplates only orders which have some effect upon their entry 
or have an "effective date," i.e., final orders, because the 
language makes no sense if applied to the type of interlocutory 
order that is the subject of this dispute. The rule only 
contemplates orders that have an affirmative "effect" that may be 
suspended during the course of review and for 10 days thereafter. 
The final order of the Division entered on August 13, 1990 
contained an effective date. The ALJ's order denying the motion 
to dismiss did not have an effective date; it merely endorses the 
status quo and allows the action to go forward, not recommending 
dismissal of the count in question. Furthermore, it would make 
little sense to suspend the effectiveness of an order denying a 
The decision of an agency is not final where the decision 
maker does not have the power to issue a final decision. This is 
so even where it appears to be the order of the agency. 
Ledbetter v. Alcohol Beverage Laws Enforcement, 764 P.2d 172, 182 
(Okla. 1988). In Ledbetter, the Director of Alcoholic Beverage 
Enforcement had only the power to recommend the imposition of 
fines to the Commission, yet the Director of Alcoholic Beverages' 
order was titled "Order of the Commission." The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court held that even though the Commission apparently acquiesced, 
the Director had no statutory authority to impose fines. 
Similarly, in the present case, the ALJ only has power to 
recommend to the Board and Division Director a proposed course of 
action. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-6(1) (1989). 
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motion. Therefore, the ALJ's order was not an order of the type 
contemplated by Rule R151-46b-12. And if it is not contemplated 
by the agency's rule, then Section 12 of the Administrative 
Procedures Act does not apply by its own terms. 
Section 12 says that where the statute or rule permits, 
agency review is available to the entity that the statute or rule 
designates for that purpose. Section 61-1-6(1) vests power to 
suspend or revoke a dealer's license with the director and a 
majority of the Securities Division. An ALJ has no power to make 
a final decision. An "order" of the ALJ, therefore, is not an 
"order" of the agency. It is a recommendation. The Director or 
the Securities Advisory Board may choose to adopt or to reject 
o 
the recommendation of the ALJ. Because the administrative law 
judge acts in an advisory capacity, orders to dismiss or to deny 
dismissal are not binding upon the Division, not subject to 
review. 
b. For Policy Reasons, Mandatory Interlocutory 
Review is Undesirable 
Johnson-Bowles claims "[i]t makes no difference what kind of 
order is involved in a Request for Agency Review." (Brief 17). 
It is precisely that view that would lead to the type of 
In Capital General Corporation v. Dept. of Business Regulation, 
777 P.2d 494 (Ut. Ct. App.), cert, denied, 781 P.2d 878 (Utah 
1989) this Court reviewed a case in which this "recommending" 
posture of the ALJ was most evident. In Capital General, the 
ALJ, after a hearing on the merits, recommended that the Division 
deny the staff's petition. The matter went to a further 
evidentiary hearing on the merits before the Securities Advisory 
Board and the Board rejected the ALJ's position, adopting their 
own findings and order which were upheld on appeal. Jd. at 496. 
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frivolous interlocutory litigation evident in this appeal, if 
all orders, and not just final orders, were reviewable, then 
parties could cripple the administrative process by requesting a 
review of every ALJ decision. 
The major policy reason behind prohibiting all orders from 
being appealable is administrative economy. In denying the 
Request for Agency Review of the matter, Securities Division 
Director John Baldwin stated, 
Review of interlocutory matters would necessarily deprive 
agency adjudicative proceedings of the simplicity and speed 
contemplated by the Administrative Procedures Act and the 
rules governing adjudicative proceedings in this Department, 
and would inappropriately interpose an interlocutory appeal 
process within the Department. 
(R. 116). 
Other jurisdictions have made similar pronouncements: 
The agency head should be accorded even wider discretion in 
determining when to review an order on an interlocutory 
basis. His powers of review are related to his regulatory 
authority, an executive function, and, consequently, are 
more expansive and flexible than those of an appellate 
judge. The agency has the sole authority to decide each 
case in order to effectuate regulatory policy. The decision 
is not that of the ALJ, but of the agency head. 
In Re Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, 90 N.J. 85, 447 
A.2d 151, 159 (1982). 
III. Johnson-Bowlesr Appeal is Moot 
On August 13, 1990, the Securities Division issued its final 
order suspending the registration of Johnson and Johnson-Bowles 
for one year. Johnson-Bowies' appeal from Judge Sawaya's order 
setting aside of the writ of mandamus is now moot. Even if this 
Court reinstates the writ of mandamus, the Securities Division 
has already reviewed and approved the findings, conclusions and 
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order that was the product of a full hearing before the 
Securities Advisory Board. Many of the same issues that 
Appellants argue in their brief were argued before the Advisory 
Board at hearing. Appellants may argue the same matters in 
administrative and judicial review of the August 13, 1990 order. 
Therefore the question of whether this court should command the 
lower court to reinstate its writ is now moot. There is no 
current harm that threatens Appellants if that order is not 
reinstated. In fact, reinstatement at this point will likely 
lead to duplication of appeals, wasting the resources of both 
parties. 
III. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction 
The District Court lacked statutory jurisdiction to issue 
the extraordinary writ requested by the petition. Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-2a-3 provides in part: 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process 
necessary . . . (b) In aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) The final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals 
from the District Court review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings of agencies, . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1989). (Emphasis added). 
Because the administrative proceeding below was a formal 
adjudicative proceeding, the District Court lacked proper 
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ. (R. 156-57). 
Furthermore, § 17 of the UAPA provides: 
(l)(a) In either the review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings by the district court or the review of formal 
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adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court 
may award damages or compensation only to the extent 
expressly authorized by statute• 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as 
required by law; . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-17 (1989). (Emphasis added). 
While the above provisions contemplate "review" of agency 
proceedings, they clearly indicate a legislative intent to assign 
jurisdiction over extraordinary writs and interlocutory appeals 
of formal administrative proceedings to the Court of Appeals, not 
the District Court. Therefore, since the appellate function and 
all matters dealing with the review of administrative proceedings 
have been assigned by statute to the Court of Appeals for 
disposition, it is safe to assume that original equity 
jurisdiction to issue necessary writs to administrative agencies 
now rests exclusively with the Court of Appeals. 
IV. Johnson-Bowies' Appeal is Frivolous 
Finally, the Securities Division is entitled to Rule 33 
damages. Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Practice 
provides for damages, specifically, attorney fees in opposing a 
frivolous appeal. Rule 33 damages are appropriate because 
Johnson-Bowles has brought this appeal solely to harass and 
perpetuate litigation. There is no justiciable issue presented 
to this court by the appeal. 
A frivolous appeal is "one in which no justiciable question 
has been presented and appeal is readily recognizable as devoid 
of merit in that there is little prospect that it can ever 
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succeed." Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990). 
Further, Rule 33(b) states: 
For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, 
not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An 
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the 
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose 
such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of 
litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party 
filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
Utah Rule App. P. 33(b) (1990). 
Johnson-Bowies' appeal serves no legal purpose. There are 
no justiciable issues before this Court. All issues have been 
resolved or can be resolved through the proper channels of 
appeal. That the appeal is frivolous is apparent in the 
observation that the standard on review is abuse of discretion. 
See Fife v. Fife, 777 P.2d 513, 514 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (where a 
judge's decision is obviously not clearly erroneous Rule 33 
damages are appropriate). 
It has always been the position of Appellees that the chief 
cause of the issuance of the lower court's writ was Johnson-
Bowles' blatant failure to inform the lower court of the ongoing 
nature of the proceedings, that its application for the 
extraordinary writ was acutely premature, and the relevant 
statutes, and agency rules would not support use of an 
extraordinary equitable remedy to address wrongs that were purely 
the matter of invention on the part of Johnson-Bowles. Continued 
pursuit of this appeal serves no practical purpose other than to 
satiate Appellant's desire to "teach the agency a lesson" by 




Johnson and Johnson-Bowles have yet to articulate the remedy 
they seek in this appeal. However, close examination of the 
record of the proceedings below must lead this court to the 
conclusion that the appeal lacks merit. The court below was on 
absolute sure-footing in its order setting aside the writ and in 
its refusal to reinstate. Pursuing the matter through this 
appeal is a step that should not have been taken and it is the 
type of wrong for which the Appellees are entitled to fees under 
Rule 33. 
Other issues raised by Appellants concerning the propriety 
of the ALJ's denial of the motion to dismiss have either already 
been resolved or can be resolved through appropriate 
administrative or judicial review of the August 13, 1990 order of 
the Division. The Securities Division has considered Johnson-
Bowies' arguments and addressed them in its Order on Agency 
Review and its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
Johnson-Bowles can raise its substantive arguments in appellate 
review proceedings. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal 
should be dismissed with attorneys fees granted under Rule 33 in 
favor of appellees. 
DATED THIS of August, 1990. 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
M 
Mark' J'. Gi#ff in 
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(b) the 
undersigned hereby certifies that on the zJl-—' day of August, 
1990, four (4) copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES were 
hand-delivered to Attorneys for Appellants John Michael Coombs 
and Craig F. McCullough at 72 East 400 South, Suite 220 Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 and eight (8) copies, one of which contained an 




IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Johnson - Bowles Company 
Plaintiff - Appellant 
VS 
John C. Baldwin 
Defendant - Appellee 
Clerkfs Certificate 
District Court No. 890906506 
Appellate Court No.. 90021^-CA 
I, clerk of the above entitled court, do hereby certify that 
the hereto attached file contains all the original papers as 
requested by the designation on file herein, filed in the court in 
the above entitled case, including the Notice of Appeal which was 
filed on the 14th day of March, 1990 I further 
certify that the above described documents constitute the Judgment 
Roll and that the same is a true and correct transcript fo the 
record as it appears in my office. 
I further certify that an Undertaking on Appeal in due form 
has been properly filed and that the same was filed on the 
14th day of March, 1990. 
I further certify that said Judgment Roll is this date 
transmitted to the Appellate Court of the State of Utah, pursuant 
to such appeal. 
Witness my hand and the seal of said court at Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this 12th day of June 1990-
CRAIG E. LUDWIG 






JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, ESQ., No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Petitioners 
•J. i 
(~^*sJcJ~~ <^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC.. a 
Utah corporation and MARLEN V. 
JOHNSON. 
Petitioners. 
JOHN C. BALDWIN. Director. 
Securities Division of the 
Department of Commerce. State 
of Utah, and M. TRUMAN BOWLER. 
KENT BURGON, DAVID HARDY. 
MARGARET WICKENS. and KEITH 
CANNON, members of the Securities 
Advisory Board overseeing the 
Securities Division. 
Respondents 
PETITION FOR EX PARTE 
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT 
•-* « * v - -*" 
CASE NO. 0 ^
^oh^oboY 
JUDGE J « S. S « & 
Petitioners Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., and Marlen V. Johnson, by and 
through their counsel and pursuant to Rule 65B(a)(2),(3), and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, hereby petition the above Court for an Ex Parte Extraordinary Writ. Based on 
Rule 65(B)(e), the Writ may be granted without notice and in this case there is no reason why 
it should not be granted without notice, particularly when Respondents will incur no damage 
or liability by its issuance. Such writ is solely intended to get Respondents to act under the 
Administrative Procedures Act as set forth below. 
- 1 - cooor: 
PETITION 
1. Petitioner Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., is a securities broker-dealer 
registered with the Securities Division, a sub-agency under the Department of Commerce, 
State of Utah. Petitioner Marlen V. Johnson is registered with the Securities Division as a 
securities agent. 
2. Respondent Baldwin is the director of the Securities Division and is 
responsible for the initiation and perpetuation of the existing administrative adjudicative 
proceedings against Petitioners. The remaining individual Respondents are each and all 
members of the Securities Advisory Board as set forth and established in §61-1-18.5, Utah 
Code Ann. Such Respondents have been appointed by the Governor to oversee Respondent 
Baldwin and the Securities Division. Petitioners believe that the Securities Advisory Board 
has neither been made aware of the existing administrative proceedings nor of Petitioners' 
Requests for Agency Review or Certification of Order as set forth below. 
3. On April 27, 1989, Respondent Baldwin in his capacity as director of the 
Securities Division of the Department of Commerce, State of Utah, filed administrative 
adjudicative proceedings against Petitioners, alleging violations on Petitioners' part of 
§61-1-6(1 )(g), Utah Code Ann. Such administrative adjudicative proceedings seek to revoke 
or suspend the registrations of Respondents with the Division and are denominated by Case 
Nos. SD-89-46BD and SD-89-47AG. 
4. On July 3. 1989. Petitioners moved the Administrative Law Judge in said 
administrative adjudicative proceedings for an Order dismissing such proceedings under 
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging that, based on §27 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Securities Division lacked subject-matter jurisdiction 
and therefore such proceedings were and are unlawful. 
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5. On August 29. 1989, the Administrative Law Judge in the 
above-proceedings issued an Order denying Petitioners' Rule 12(b)(1) motion, erroneously 
concluding that NASD rules do not have the force and effect of federal law, among other 
assignments of error. 
6. On September 11, 1989, Petitioners timely filed a Request for Agency Review 
and Request for Hearing on such Order in accordance with §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. A 
true and correct copy of such Request for Agency Review is attached hereto and 
incorporated by reference as Exhibit "A". On September 11, 1989, Petitioners also filed an 
alternative Request for Certification of the August 29, 1989 Order as a "Final Agency 
Action", a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference 
as Exhibit "B". Petitioners further filed on said date a Request for Disclosure of Appellate 
Body Conflicts by and between them and the Securities Advisory Board, a true and correct 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C". On September 11, 1989, Petitioners also 
filed a Brief in Support of their Request for Agency Review, a true and correct copy of which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "D". Subsequently, Petitioners further filed a Reply Brief to 
their Request for Agency Review, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and 
incorporated by reference Exhibit "E". 
7. Since September 11, 1989, the date Petitioners filed their Requests for 
Agency Review or for Certification, Petitioners have heard nothing from either Respondent 
Baldwin or the Securities Advisory Board Member Respondents. Petitioners believe and 
allege that Respondent Baldwin is deliberately or negligently stalling the disposition of 
Petitioners' Request for Agency Review and that nothing will transpire in that regard in the 
immediate future in the absence of the granting of this Extraordinary Writ. Petitioners 
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further believe that Respondent Baldwin has failed to notify or properly inform the 
Securities Advisory Board of Petitioners' formal Requests. 
8. Petitioners have been substantially damaged in their property, business, and 
reputations by the Division's initiation of the above-referenced administrative adjudicative 
proceedings and because of the Respondents' unwillingness or failures to diligently act on 
Petitioners' Requests for Agency Review or for Certification, Petitioners are continuing to 
be substantially damaged in their business, property, and reputations. (See Affidavit of 
Petitioners attached as Exhibit "C" to Exhibit "D" hereto.) 
GROUNDS FOR RELIEF 
9. Under Rule 65(B)(b)(2), an extraordinary writ may be granted where an 
inferior tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has abused its discretion. In 
this case, Petitioners allege that Respondent Baldwin in particular has abused his discretion 
on behalf of the Securities Division and the other Respondents in failing to act on 
Petitioners' September 11, 1989, Requests for Agency Review or for Certification. 
10. Under Rule 65(B)(b)(3), an extraordinary writ may also be granted where 
the relief sought is to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right.. 
. to which he is entitled and from which he is unlawfully excluded by such inferior tribunal.. 
. board or person. In this case, the Respondents, by and through Respondent Baldwin, have 
failed to act on Petitioners' Requests for either Agency Review or for Certification — 
"rights1' to which they are entitled and from which they have been unlawfully excluded to 
date under the Administrative Procedures Act. 
WHEREFORE Petitioners pray for the granting of an Ex Parte Extraordinary Writ 
directing the Respondents to either (1) grant their Request for Agency Review as 
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contemplated in Exhibits "A" - "E" hereto or (2) otherwise certify the Administrative Law 
Judge's Order of August 29. 1989. as a "final agency action" as contemplated in 
§63-46b-14, Utah Code Ann. Because there is nothing to dispute with respect to the 
foregoing Petition, because Respondents will not be damaged in the least by the issuance of 
such a writ, and further, because Petitioners will continue to be damaged and prejudiced by 
further delay and stalling on the part of Respondents acting through Baldwin, Petitioners 
pray that their Petition be granted immediately and without notice as provided in Rule 
65(B)(e). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In the event the Court does not grant this writ ex 
parte and the Division resists this Petition at a forthcoming hearing. Petitioners pray for an 
award of substantial Rule 11 and §78-27-56 sanctions against the Division. 
DATED this 27th day of October. 1989/ 
PETITION.1-2 
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
REQUEST FOR AGENCY REVIEW 
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that in accordance with §63-46b-12. Utah Code Ann., 
and/or R151-46b-12(A) of the Rules of Procedure for Adjudicative Proceedings Before the 
Department of Business Regulation. Respondents hereby request agency or superior agency 
review of the Administrative Law Judge's Order dated August 29.1989, a true and correct 
copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Respondents' Exhibit 
"A". Respondents further request oral argument in accordance therewith. This Request is 
timely filed in that Respondents' counsel did not receive the August 29. Order until August 
31.1989. 
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Respondents' grounds for requesting agency or superior agency review and 
oral argument thereon include but are not limited to the following: 
(1) the Court's August 29.1989. Order. Exhibit "A" hereto, is non-responsive to 
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and erroneously treats Respondents' 
motion as a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) as argued at the hearing by the Division; 
(2) the Order contains erroneous, superfluous, and irrelevant findings of fact 
and conclusions of law relative to Respondents' Rule 12(b)(1) Motion and otherwise assumes 
facts neither pleaded, admitted, nor in evidence and which otherwise improperly tend to go 
to the merits of the Division's case; 
(3) the Order erroneously compels the necessary legal conclusion that it would 
have been possible for Respondents/as Utah residents, to have complied with their federal 
NASD and SEC obligations, either themselves or by allowing -buy-ins" for their "own 
account*, without violating the Division's unilateral and capricious interpretation of its own 
March 1. Order; 
(4) the Order is erroneous as a matter of law in concluding that the Division 
has been delegated power and authority (i.e.. jurisdiction) to issue orders, unilaterally 
interpret them, and thereby discipline an NASD member merely for obeying and complying 
with superseding and pre-emptive federal securities law — "state action" further repugnant 
to the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution in that Congress has 
expressly delegated enforcement and interpretation of an NASD and SEC duty, liability, or 
obligation to the federal courts under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; 
(5) the Order could not be more erroneous as a matter of law in concluding on 
page 4 that "NASD rules . . . should not be accorded the force and effect of federal law . . . 
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(6) the Order is erroneous in concluding that the Division's March 1.1989 
Order — which says nothing of prohibiting "purchases" — quite literally supersedes and 
overrides federal securities law specifically governed under the Exchange Act and over 
which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction; 
(7) the Order is erroneous as a matter of law Insofar as It concludes that the 
Division, in light of §28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, can inconsistently regulate and 
even discipline federal licensees contrary to express mandates of federal law, specifically, 
that the Division can deem an act "unethical" when the preemptive federal regulatory 
scheme declares the very same act "ethical"; 
(8) the Order is erroneous in concluding that the Division can give unlawful 
extra-territorial effect to its Order of March 1 and otherwise give such Order a predatory 
and discriminatory effect on Respondents; and 
(9) the August 29, 1989 Order is erroneous in not concluding that the 
Division's Amended Petitions are barred by pre-emption under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 and otherwise repugnant to the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the 
Constitution. 
Respondents have the right to seek agency review of the August 29. Order and 
otherwise exhaust their administrative remedies in that If the Division lacks subject-matter 
jurisdiction, which it does, these entire proceedings are unlawful and a waste of all parties' 
time, energy, and money, particularly when such proceedings have already subjected and 
continue to subject Respondents to substantial damages. Respondents further have a right 
to seek agency review of the Order of August 29. because it is not a "non-final procedural 
ruling" of the Division. Thermal Ecology Must Be Preserved v. Atomic Energy Commission. 
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433 F.2d 524. 526 (D.C.Cir. 1970). See also Ecee. inc. v. Federal Power Commission. 526 
F.2d 1270.1273 (5th Cir.). cert, denied. 429 U.S. 866. 97 S.Ct. 176. 50 L.Ed.2d 147 (1976); 
Coca-Cola Company v. Federal Trade Commission. 475 F.2d 299,302 (5th Cir.). cert. 
denied. 414 U.S. 877. 94 S.Ct. 121. 38 LEd.2d 122 (1973). 
Based on the foregoing and §63-46b-12(1)(b)(ii). Utah Code Ann.. Respondents 
pray for immediate reversal of the August 29.1989 Order and for an Order declaring that 
the Division has no jurisdiction to either unilaterally interpret its March 1. 1989 Order 
inconsistently with federal securities law or otherwise bring a revocation proceeding 
against an NASD member merely for obeying, complying, or attempting to comply with 
superseding Exchange Act rules and regulations. 
In accordance with applicable Department of Commerce rules. Respondents 
herewith file a Brief in support of their grounds for review. The parties seeking review 
further sign this Request as required under §63-46(b)- 12(b)(1), Utah Code Ann. 
Respondents further hereby give notice that the Division shall have fifteen (15) days from 
the date of its receipt hereof to file a responsive pleading if it so desires. 
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Registration of 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. 
CRD No. 07678 
In the Matter of the Registration of 
Marlen Vernon Johnson 
CRD No. 2598888 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
ACCOMPANYING ORDER 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
Appearances: 
John Michael Coombs and Craig F. McCullough for Respondents 
Mark J. Griffin for the Division of Securities 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
By Motion, dated July 3,1989, Respondents seek a dismissal of the instant adjudicative 
proceedings. A memorandum in opposition thereto was filed by the Division on July 13, 1989. On the 
just-stated date. Respondents also filed an affidavit in support of the motion to dismiss. 
Oral argument on the pending motion was conducted on July 14,1989, at which time Respondents 
filed a reply memorandum and copies of six (6) letters relative thereto. 
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. is a securities broker and Respondent Marlen 
Vernon Johnson is a securities agent and principal of the just-named company. Respondents are duly 
registered by the Division of Securities of the State of Utah. 
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EXHIBIT. * 
2. By Summary Order, dated March U1989. the DMrioadari&dtffetvdbMBtyortfl 
transactional exemptions relative to the securities of UJS.A. Medical Corporation. The Summary Older has 
been in effect on a continuous basis since the just-stated date. 
3. Prior to entry of the March 1,1989 Summary Order, Respondent Johnson, as an agent and 
principal for Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., had effected transactions in the securities of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation. Sparing detail, outstanding contracts existed between Respondent Johnson-
Bowles Company, Inc. and various third parties respecting the sale of the securities in question by 
Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. to those third parties. Specifically, said contracts existed prior 
to issuance of the March 1,1989 Summary Order. 
4. Given the just-described contracts, and in order to effect the delivery of the securities in question 
to various third parties. Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., through Respondent Marten Vernon 
Johnson, purchased approximately 364,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation stock from seven (7) 
individuals between April 3,1989 and April 13,1989. Respondents were aware of the March 1,1989 
Summary Order when the just-described purchases were made. 
5. On April 27,1989, the Division filed a Notice of Agency Action and Petition, wherein it was 
alleged that Respondents had willfully violated or willfully failed to comply with the March 1,1989 
Summary Order and that they had engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business. 
Pursuant to an Amended Petition, dated July 19,1989, the Division has withdrawn the allegation that 
Respondents had either willfully violated or willfully failed to comply with the March 1,1989 Summary 
Order. However, based on the allegation that Respondents have engaged in dishonest or unethical practices 
in the securities business, the Division seeks entry of an order suspending or revoking the respective 
registration of Respondents Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. and Marlen Vemon Johnson. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondents assert that the Division lacks subject matter jurisdiction to initiate the instant 
proceeding and to enter any disciplinary sanction as to their existing registration. Specifically, Respondents 
contend that rules of conduct promulgated by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) 
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required that they complete their existing contracts by either payment or deli very of the securities In 
question. Respondents further contend that compliance with that directive prompted their purchase of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities from certain Utah residents subsequent to the issuance of the March 
1,1989 Summary Order and that said Order prohibited only the sale, but not the purchase, of the just-stated 
securities. In essence. Respondents urge that the pertinent NASD rules of conduct promulgated pursuant to 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 necessarily supercede the operation of the March 1,1989 Summary 
Order and, thus, the instant proceeding should be dismissed. 
During oral argument on the pending motion, counsel for Respondents extensively addressed those 
rules of conduct which govern NASD members and whether Respondents could have been subject to 
disciplinary sanction regarding their membership in that organization for any failure to comply with said 
rules. In rejoinder, counsel for the Division has urged that Respondents could have fulfilled their 
contractual obligations to third parties by means other than a purchase of U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
securities, but that it was financially advantageous for Respondents to act as they did. The Division has 
also asserted that Respondents solicited the sale of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities and that any such 
solicitation is relevant to whether Respondents engaged in dishonest and unethical securities practices. 
Notwithstanding the belabored arguments which were presented as to the foregoing matters, the 
operative effect of the March 1,1989 Summary Order was to prevent the sale of unregistered securities to 
Utah residents. Both parties concede that those securities had been the subject of market manipulation and 
securities fraud. Under such circumstances, issuance of the Summary Order was clearly intended to preclude 
any subsequent sale of those securities within this state. 
With knowledge of the existence of the Summary Order, Respondents purchased said securities 
from certain Utah residents. In so doing. Respondents' conduct effectively frustrated the attempts of the 
Division to preclude the trading of those unregistered securities. Whether Respondents solicited the sale of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities (and Respondents have strenuously urged that they did not), it is 
obvious that their participation in those transactions as a purchaser of those securities facilitated a violation 
of the Summary Order as to potentially subject them to disciplinary sanction in these proceedings. 
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Respondents' assertion that NASD rules of conduct should be accorded the force and effect of federal 
law, as to thus obviate compliance with the March 1,1989 Summary Order, is not well-founded. 
Concededly, had Respondents owned the securities prior to March 1,1989 and merely delivered those 
securities to third parties after the Summary Order had been issued, such a ministerial act may not have 
exposed Respondents to possible revocation or suspension of their registration. However, Respondents' 
purchase of the securities after March 1,1989 to effect their subsequent delivery of those securities to third 
parties was squarely at odds with the operative effect of the March 1,1989 Summary Order. Simply put, 
any necessary compliance by Respondents with NASD rules as a member of that self-regulatory 
organization does not lend support to the conclusion that the Division lacks subject matter jurisdiction in 
this case. 
Two further matters should be addressed. Both parties have noted certain aggravating and/or 
mitigating factors in this case and have urged that such factors should be considered relative to the merits of 
the pending motion. Without doubt, such circumstances are relevant as to any possible entry of a 
disciplinary sanction at some subsequent stage in these proceedings. However, those factors are not 
germane to the matter presently before the Court. 
Respondents have also requested that any order denying the pending motion be certified as Tinal", 
so that necessary review of that order can be sought. Section 63^46b-l2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as 
amended, provides that parties to any adjudicative proceeding may seek review "of an order by the agency" 
and sets forth the procedure to obtain any such review. R15l-46b- 12(A) is further applicable in that 
respect. Presumably, Respondents' request that any order issued on the pending motion be certified as final 
is one directed toward the provisions of Section 63-46b-14, which provides: 
(1) Any party aggrieved may obtain judicial review affinal agency action, 
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. (All 
emphasis herein added). 
It is not within the province of this Court to decided whether the order set forth below is TinaT, as to allow 
for subsequent judicial review, nor to certify any such order as being final for purposes of such review. 
However, the order herein is subject to agency review, as set forth above. 
4 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondents' motion to dismiss the July 19,1989 
Amended Petition is denied. 
Dated this Q / 7 *^ day of August, 1989. 
JMS 
Jt/Jteven Eklund 
linistrative Law Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have this day mailed the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and Accompanying . 
Order, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to John Michael Coombs, 72 East 400 South, Suite 220, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111; to Craig F. McCullough, Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 8th Floor, Kennecott 
Building, 10 East South Temple Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84113, co-counsel for Respondents; and to 
Mark J. Griffin, Assistant Attorney General for tfie Division of Securities at Tax & Business Regulation 
Division, 130 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
Dated this O?^/ day of August. 1989. 
ooo 
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR 
AGENCY REVIEW 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
Respondents, by and through their counsel, hereby submit this Reply Brief in 
Support of their September 11,1989. Request for Agency Review of an August 29,1989, 
Order and for a Hearing thereon. 
COUNTERPOINT I 
The discussion on pages 4 through 5 of the Division's Opposing Brief 
(mischaracterized as a "Brief in Reply") is illogical. Therein, the Division fallaciously argues 
that because the NASD is authorized under the Exchange Act to discipline a member for 
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This makes no sense whatsoever, especially if one realizes that to engage in the business of 
a securities broker-dealer and agent in these United States, one must, as a matter of law. 
be a member of the NASD. (This is only true, however, if one is not simultaneously a member 
of a national securities exchange which Respondents are not.) In other words, if one must 
obey NASD rules to not only lawfully engage but lawfully remain in business, such person is 
clearly required by jaw to obey such rules. The Division's argument on this point is 
inexcusable nonsense, particularly when the NASD exists solely by virtue of the Exchange 
Act and the SEC. Certainly NASD rules are not hollow and meaningless as the Division would 
want us all to believe in these proceedings and there is no question that they have the 
effect of federal law —the contrary 61 which was concluded in the August 29. 1989, Order 
subject to this request for agency review. Lastly, if NASD rules meant nothing, why has the 
Division itself specifically -patterned" its own R177-6-1 g after the very NASD rules in issue 
in this case? 
COUNTERPOINT II 
On the last paragraph of page 4 of the Opposing Brief, the Division argues that 
§28(a) and §27 of the Exchange Act do not exist as far as the Division is concerned and that 
federal courts apparently do not have exclusive jurisdiction over that which is contemplated 
in and governed under the Exchange Act. Nonetheless, whatever the "intention" of the 
Division may be by way of its amended petitions, the fact remains that the instant 
proceedings are in diametric conflict with Exchange Act mandates. For the sake of 
interstate commerce and ensuring that the economy operates smoothly, the Exchange Act 
requires completion of brokerage transactions and does not tolerate excuses in that 
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regard. (The Exchange Act does, however, allow trades to be "broken" on mutual consent 
of the parties but such is not at issue in these proceedings since those out-of-state 
entities to whom Respondents owed stock refused or were contractually unable to "break" 
the trades in issue.) Because the Division is apparently unable to comprehend this point and 
Respondents cannot state it more clearly than they have, nothing more can be said in this 
regard. 
COUNTERPOINT III 
Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 34-7920 is relevant to these proceedings 
because it was issued to give people like Respondents guidance in their business. Contrary 
to what the Division asserts, the Release does not say that "completion" of outstanding 
federal obligations entered into prior to the date of a federal suspension order (not a state 
order) excludes buying stock to ministerially complete such federal executory contracts. 
[Emphasis added.] The Release also has no bearing on and says nothing of state 
suspension orders. In fact, the Release does not contemplate any state orders of any kind. 
Further, the Release clearly permits completion of federal contracts by "delivery" which is 
exactly what Respondents did. The Division is hopelessly trying to read something into Rel. 
No. 34-7920 which is simply not there. The Division has also cited no authority lending itself 
to the Division's own self-serving interpretation of the Exchange Act Release. Because 
such Release has the effect of federal law or rule, the Division's position is in further 
diametric conflict with the Exchange Act. 
COUNTERPOINT IV 
In Argument A, page 7 of the Opposing Brief, the Division argues that 
§63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann., and R151-46b-12, Department of Commerce Rules, only 
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contemplate review of "final" orders of the Division. This position Is antithetical to the 
express language of such statute and the concomitant rule which merely contemplate an 
agency "order". The Division has S12 of the APA confused with S14 which requires a "final 
agency action" prior to seeking "judicial review", not agency review. The Division's argument 
on this point is thus a total misreading and misunderstanding of applicable law. 
Agency review of the Order of August 29,1989. also does not cause any delay 
in these proceedings as desperately argued by the Division. This is because the 
Administrative Law Judge has ordered Respondents to file an answer, which they did on 
October 4.1989. Further, because a reversal of the August 29, Order, would be entirely 
dispositive of these proceedings, review of such Order would in fact expedite the just and 
proper resolution of the amended petitions as contemplated in the APA. It is accordingly 
undisputed that agency review is thus in everyone's best interests, including the Division's. 
COUNTERPOINT V 
The Division's Argument B on pages 7 and 8 of their Opposing Brief has no 
merit for the reasons contained in the preceding Counterpoint. Further, a balancing test of 
any kind is neither required nor necessary and to not review the Order of August 29, when it 
may indeed be error, would substantially prejudice Respondents. Again, this is because a 
reversal of such Order would immediately dispense with these entire proceedings and save 
everyone, including the Utah taxpayer, a lot of time, energy, and expense. 
COUNTERPOINT VI 
With respect to Argument C in the Opposing Brief. Respondents acknowledge 
that in oral argument on their Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss the words "non-delegation" 
and ultra vires were not stated. This is because when a court engages in a pre-emption 
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analysis, it is not necessary to get into a further analysis of the Supremacy and Commerce 
Clauses. Schneiderwind v. ANR Pipeline Company. 108 S.Ct. 1145.485 U.S. 293 (March 22. 
1988Hholding that a pre-emption question only involves an analysis of Congressional intent 
and does not. at that point, require deciding Constitutional issues such as the Commerce 
Clause). Respondents have asserted that the primary and most readily dispositive issue in 
this case is pre-emption. For this reason. Respondents did not contemplate that this 
specific issue would be either misunderstood or by-passed in the August 29.1989. ruling. 
Regardless, because pre-emption was an issue and was apparently deemed by the 
Administrative Law Judge to have no merit. Respondents believe and assert that it was 
incumbent upon the Administrative Law Judge to then go the required step further and 
apply Constitutional principles such as "non-delegation" and ultra vires. In other words. 
Respondents should not be penalized in these proceedings merely because their counsel 
lacked the foresight to anticipate how the Administrative Law Judge would rule on the 
pre-emption issue. Based on the foregoing, such issues are relevant and they were 
therefore indirectly before the Administrative Law Judge at the hearing, particularly when 
the Administrative Law Judge undoubtedly knows far more about Constitutional law than 
Respondents' counsel. Respondents thus contend that because these issues were not 
addressed in the August 29. Order, it is thus reversible error. 
The fact that the Division is so viciously fighting any just resolution of these 
proceedings on the merits is disconcerting to say the least. For instance, why is it so 
difficult for the Division to simply say: "If we are wrong, perhaps the amended petitions 
ought to be dismissed and we should get on to something more noble?" Is such a position 
really something so terrible? Surely, if there is merit to the "non-delegation" and ultra vires 
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arguments posed by Respondents in their Supporting Brief, such arguments ought to be 
considered in the interests of justice. Simply put, how much of the taxpayers' money is 
really justified in being spent prosecuting Respondents for something that harmed no one. 
especially if these entire proceedings can be resolved quickly on agency review? One can 
only conclude that because the Division is so irrationally concerned with Respondents* 
raising of an issue which is dispositive of this case, these proceedings are obviously brought 
in bad faith. As stated before, it is unfortunate that the Division's very last concern in these 
proceedings is the doing of justice. 
COUNTERPOINT VII 
In Argument D. the Division claims that NASD rules do not have the force and 
effect of law. If not. why has the Utah Court of Appeals in the Western Capital case held 
that a Utah court has no jurisdiction to hear or interpret NASD rules? This argument is 
particularly ironic in that the Division's own "dishonest and unethical practices" rule is 
specifically and expressly "patterned" after the very NASD rule in issue in this case. Clearly, 
the NASD was created to help the SEC administer the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
How then, can the NASD not only not be accorded the force and effect of federal law. but 
any law at all? Is it really the Division's position that the NASD was not created in and under 
the '34 Act and that Respondents are somehow miraculously making this all up? 
The amended petitions are in conflict with federal law simply because 
Respondents could not have complied with Judge Greene's ruling and NASD rules, on the 
one hand, and the Division's unilateral interpretation of its own March Orders, on the other, 
at the same time. If the Division does not see this as a conflict then there is simply nothing 
more that can be said by anyone. Section 27 of the Exchange Act expressly provides that 
ooosa 
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obligations, duties, and liabilities relative to trading securities In Interstate commerce must 
be redressed in a U.S. District Court. The Division's amended petitions seek to create a 
liability for Respondents' trading of securities in interstate commerce in conformity with 
Exchange Act mandates and a federal judge's ruling. For this reason, it is impossible that 
there could be no conflict. It is further impossible that the Division could have 
subject-matter jurisdiction relative to these proceedings when the enforcement of 
Exchange Act obligations, duties, and liabilities are the only issue in this case. 
In Argument D the Division proceeds to argue that the thrust of the Division's 
amended petitions impose no burden on interstate commerce. This statement ignores the 
facts of this case. Had Respondents not honored their Exchange Act contracts, several 
out-of-state NASD member broker-dealers and perhaps the largest clearing corporation in 
the United States would have been severely damaged. At the same time, the Division does 
not see this as having any impact on interstate commerce. If not. then what is it? The 
Division would also have us all believe that Respondents should have allowed those 
out-of-state entities to have bought Respondents "in." This argument ignores the fact that 
such would have immediately put Respondents out of business and such would have even 
more severely damaged each of those out-of-state entities who were owed U.S.A. Medical 
stock. This is because Respondents could not have repaid such entities and each would 
have forever been out-of-pocket whatever each would have had to expend to effect the 
necessary "buy-ins". 
The Division further argues that if the court engages in a balancing test "the 
interest of the state in containing the further distribution of U.S.A. Medical stock" 
outweighs Respondents' interest in complying with federal law. This statement ignores the 
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enormous clearing corporation which also have an interest In seeing Respondents complete 
their federal contracts. Further, this argument is astoundingty hypocritical and 
preposterous in that if the Division were sincerely concerned about any U.S.A. Medical stock 
not being distributed out of the state of Utah, it would not have given Susan Slattery and 
P.B. Jameson a secret and private No-Action Letter which accomplishes the exact opposite 
of this purported goal, namely, to encourage the unlawful distribution of U.S.A. Medical 
stock out of the state of Utah at great benefit to the U.S.A. Medical Co-Conspirators. (A 
true and correct copy of such No-Action Letter is attached hereto and incorporated by 
reference as Exhibit "A". See also Respondents' Answer and Counterclaim on file herein 
dated October 4. 1989. Affirmative Defense 8 therein.) To be sure, such No-Action Letter 
clearly enables a Utah resident (more especially a U.S.A. Medical Co-Conspirator) to 
contact an out-of-state "nominee" and ask him or her to place a so-called "unsolicited 
order" with Susan Slattery and P.B. Jameson. If necessary, the Utah resident, to cover his 
tracks, can mail or federal express the stock certificates to the out-of-state resident who 
in turn can easily furnish them to the alleged selling broker — all as necessary to technically 
comply with the August 9.1989 No-Action Letter. Further, the stock confirmation would be 
routinely stamped "unsolicited" and so no one. including the Division, would be any the 
"wiser". All of this, by the way. white the U.S.A. Medical Co-Conspirators are "touting" the 
stock of U.S.A. Medical all over the United States and creating a market for their stock 
which they can then sell via a Utah agent and a Utah broker-dealer (whom they control) at 
substantial illegal profits to themselves. This is but a simple example of the effect of the 
Division's ingenious No-Action Letter on which there are an infinite number of variations. 
On th# othor hand. If the Division falls to eoe this as m complete undarmlnlng of Its March 
Orders and as a natural consequence of its brilliant No-Action Letter and, if it otherwise 
fails to see that such No-Action Letter enables and encourages a nationwide distribution of 
the entire U.S.A. Medical "box" from the state Utah, the Division is surely naive to say the 
least and has no business whatsoever regulating securities in this state or any other state. 
On the other hand, if the Division's March Orders have the effect of deeming 
U.S.A. Medical stock as "bad stock" which no Utah agent or broker should have anything to 
do with, it is grossly inconsistent for the Division to say that a Utah agent such as Slattery 
and a Utah broker-dealer such as P.B. Jameson can effect transactions in such stock they 
clearly know to be "bad stock" and not be engaging in "dishonest and unethical practices" 
— the very same allegation presently being leveled against Respondents. By the same 
token, if the Division concedes that it has no jurisdiction over a U.S.A. Medical transaction 
between an out-of-state broker and a Utah broker or agent — as clearly set forth in the 
No-Action Letter — how can the Division simultaneously have jurisdiction over the instant 
amended petitions and the conduct of Respondents in completing broker-to-broker 
transactions entered into prior to March 1? 
In sum. the Division argues that its amended petitions do not impose a burden 
on interstate commerce merely because it doesn't think they do. The Division forgets the 
other part of the Supreme Court's balancing test which requires a "local putative benefit" 
that "outweighs" the burden on interstate commerce. Unfortunately for the Division, there 
is no such "local putative benefit" resulting from the amended petitions and the Division has 
shown none, and therefore, as a matter of law. the amended petitions impose a substantial 
burden on interstate commerce in relation to local needs and objectives. Just ask one of 
the out-of-state NASD members and Midwest Clearing if they would presently rather be 
arbitrating and litigating against a bankrupt debtor whose assets have been thrown into the 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation f SIPC"). The answer Is obvious. 
CONCLUSION 
In so adamantly resisting Respondents' Request for Agency Review, the 
Division's attitude brings to mind the words of philosopher Herbert Spencer who said: 
There is a principle which is a bar against all information, which 
is proof against all arguments and which cannot fail to keep a 
man in everlasting ignorance — that principle is contempt prior 
to investigation. 
Because all parties have something to gain by this Request for Agency Review, Respondents 
urge that it be granted forthwith and that they get an opportunity to make their arguments 
before the Securities Advisory Board as set forth in their pleadings on file herein. Surely the 
Securities Advisory Board should know what is going on in this case and its input may well 
shed valuable light on the issues presented. Finally, because Respondents also believe the 
Order of August 29, 1989, improperly has the effect of a premature ruling on the merits of 
this case, it must be reversed. 
DATED this 6th day of October. 1989^  
CERTIFICATPOF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 6th day of October, 1989. (s)he 
hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN 
SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY REVIEW, including Exhibit MAH. to John C. Baldwin. 
Director and Kathleen C. McGinley, Director of Broker-Dealer Section, Securities Division, 
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Utah Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah 
84145-0802; Administrative Law Judge and Presiding Officer J. Stephen Eklund. Esq.. 
Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802, Salt Lake City. Utah 
84145-0802; Mark J. Griffin. Esq.. Assistant Attorney General. 115 South State Capitol. Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114; and mailed the same, postage prepaid to Craig F. McCullough. Esq.. 
Callister. Duncan, & Nebeker, Co-Counsel to Respondents. 8th Floor, Kennecott BIdg.. 10 




JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 363© 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Petitioners 
I IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.. a 
Utah corporation and MARLEN V. 
JOHNSON. 
Petitioners. 
JOHN C. BALDWIN, Director. 
Securities Division of the 
Department of Commerce. State 
of Utah, and M. TRUMAN BOWLER, 
KENT BURGON. DAVID HARDY. 
MARGARET WICKENS. and KEITH 
CANNON, members of the Securities 
Advisory Board overseeing the 
Securities Division, 
Respondents 
EX PARTE ORDER GRANTING 
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT AND 
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT 
CASE NO. S%?Db'50k> ( V 
JUDGE JAMES S. S A M 
The Petition for Extraordinary Writ in the above-matter seeking issuance of a 
writ from this Court to be directed to Respondents to either grant Petitioners' Request for 
Agency Review (and thereby review the same) or to otherwise certify the subject order on 
review as a "final agency action" having come before this Court; the Court having reviewed 
the Petition and having determined that a hearing is not necessary, and good cause further 
appearing, the Court hereby orders as follows: 
1. The Petition for Extraordinary Writ in the above-matter is hereby granted. 
- 1 -
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ft. The Weepoodenf are hereby Immediately directed to undertake one of the 
following courses of action: 
(1) Either grant Petitioners' Request for Agency Review as contemplated in 
the Exhibits attached to the Petition and thereupon resolve all issues 
presented therein, or 
(2) Certify the Administrative Law Judge's Order of August 29.1989. as a 
"final agency action" as contemplated in §63-46b-14, Utah Code Ann. 




Jfufd District Court Judge 
" 2 - MA->«V.> cooo;; 
Third Judicial District 
R. PAUL VAN DAM, #3312 
Utah Attorney General 
MARK J. GRIFFIN, #4329 
Assistant Attorney General 
115 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(801) 538-1331 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC., a 




JOHN C. BALDWIN, Director, 
Securities Division of the 
Department of Commerce, State 
of Utah, and M. TRUMAN BOWLER, 
KENT BURGON, DAVID HARDY, 
MARGARET WICKENS, AND KEITH 
CANNON, members of the 
Securities Advisory Board 
overseeing the Securities 
Division, 
Respondents. 
EX PARTE ORDER SETTING 
ASIDE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT 
Case No. 890906506 CV 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
The Court having reviewed the Ex Parte Petition to Set Aside 
Ex Parte Order issued by this Court on October 27, 1989, and the 
Court being satisfied in having heard the Respondent's arguments 
in support of the Petition and being satisfied that there is just 
cause appearing therefore, hereby 
coioa 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that this Court's Ex Parte 
Order dated October 27, 1989, requiring the Respondents to 
perform certain acts, is hereby set aside. 
DATED this / ~ day of J^^C>^^JAA^, 1989. 
nn 
R. PAUL VAN DAM, #3312 
Utah Attorney General 
MARK J. GRIFFIN, #4329 
Assistant Attorney General 
115 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(801) 538-1331 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC., a 




JOHN C. BALDWIN, Director, 
Securities Division of the 
Department of Commerce, State 
of Utah, and M. TRUMAN BOWLER, 
KENT BURGON, DAVID HARDY, 
MARGARET WICKENS, AND KEITH 
CANNON, members of the 
Securities Advisory Board 
overseeing the Securities 
Division, 
Respondents. 
EX PARTE PETITION TO 
SET ASIDE EX PARTE ORDER 
Case No. 890906506 CV 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
The respondents by and through their attorney, Mark J. 
Griffin, Assistant Attorney General, pursuant to Rule 7(b)(2) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby petition the above 
court ex parte to set aside court's order dated October 27, 1989. 
Rule 7(b)(2) provides in pertinent part that "any order made 
without notice the adverse party may be vacated or modified 
without notice by the judge who made it". C0105 
The respondents request that the court set aside its October 
27th order based upon the following facts and arguments: 
1. On April 27, 1989 the Utah Securities Division, whose 
director is respondent John C. Baldwin, initiated an 
administrative adjudicative proceeding against the petitioners in 
this matter, alleging violations of the statutory prohibition 
against dishonest and unethical conduct in the petitioners' 
capacity as licensees of the Division. The aim of the ongoing 
adjudicative proceeding is to determine whether or not to revoke 
or suspend the registration of the petitioners. 
2. On August 29, 1989, following hearing and briefs, the 
Administrative Law Judge denied petitioners' motion to dismiss 
the administrative action, previously filed July 3, 1989. On 
September 11, 1989 petitioners filed a request for agency review 
and request for hearing of their request. The petition was filed 
with the Utah Securities Division, and John C. Baldwin acted as 
presiding officer, designated by the Division to review 
petitioners' request. 
3. On September 26, 1989 the Division filed a brief in 
reply to petitioners' request for agency review and hearing, 
which set forth the reasons underlying the Division's belief that 
agency review in this matter, being discretionary with the 
administrative forum, would not be appropriate because the order 
of the Administrative Law Judge to deny petitioners' motion to 
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dismiss was in the nature of an -interlocutory order"f not the 
appropriate subject for review under S63-46b-13 of the 
Administrative Procedures Act. A copy of the division's reply 
brief was mailed to petitioners' counsel of September 26, 1989 at 
his business address. 
4. On October 6, 1989 the petitioners' counsel filed a 
reply brief with the Division in support of petitioners request 
for agency review. All told, 93 pages of pleadings and exhibits 
were filed for Mr. Baldwin's review. On October 30, 1989 John C. 
Baldwin, as the presiding officer, issued the Division's order on 
agency review, attached as Exhibit A. The order, among other 
things, denies the petitioners request for agency review. 
5. On October 30, 1989 the Division received the court's 
ex parte order granting petitioners' extraordinary writ requiring 
the respondents in this matter to elect between granting the 
petitioners' request for agency review or certify the 
Administrative Law Judge's order denying petitioners' motion to 
dismiss as a "final agency action". 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PETITION TO SET ASIDE 
EX PARTE ORDER 
POINT I 
THE PETITIONERS HAVE SOUGHT TO DECEIVE THE COURT 
Petitioners have attempted to hoodwink this Court into 
believing that the Division was not responding to Petition's 
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Request for Review. The Petitioners have deliberately omitted to 
state facts in their petition necessary to the Court's 
determination as to whether the Court should issue this 
extraordinary writ. For example, the Petitioners have failed to 
state to the Court that this matter was a matter of ongoing 
pleading, i.e., that Petitioner's counsel had spoken to counsel 
for the Respondents and such conversations were concerning the 
ongoing pleading which was to take place pursuant to the 
Petitioner's request for agency review. Further, the Court is 
not notified by Petitioners that the Respondents had filed on 
September 26, 1989 a brief in reply to Petitioners' request for 
agency review. Petitioners neatly leave that document out of 
their exhibit list so that the Court does not have an opportunity 
to examine the true facts which were that this matter was a 
matter of ongoing pleading. Omission of that brief in reply 
(Exhibit B) was calculated again to misinform the Court, by not 
acquainting the Court with the substantial reasons contained 
therein that indicate that the Petitioners' request for agency 
review was wholly inappropriate. Petitioners have hoped that by 
denying the Court these facts, the Petitioners would be able to 
secure ex parte relief which might somehow stampede the Division 
into acting in a way which prudent judgment and timely review 
would not consider. 
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POINT II 
THE PETITIONERS HAVE MO BASIS UNDER RULE 
65B OR THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 
SECTION 63-46b-l BT SBQ. TO PETITION FOR 
AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT FROM THIS COURT, 
Rule 65B(b) provides, in pertinent part, that: 
(b) appropriate relief may be granted: . . . 
(2) where an inferior tribunal, board or officer 
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its 
jurisdiction or abused its discretion; or 
(3) the relief sought is to compel any inferior 
tribunal, or any corporation, board or person to 
perform an act which the law specially enjoins as 
a duty resulting from an office/ trust, or 
station; or to compel the admission of a party to 
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to 
which he is entitled and from which he is 
unlawfully excluded by such inferior tribunal or 
by such corporation, board or person; [emphasis 
added] 
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to base 
their petition for an ex parte writ upon facts which would 
indicate to this Court that the Respondents, in exercising 
judicial functions, have exceeded their jurisdiction or abused 
their discretion. Alternatively, Petitioners may support their 
petition by demonstrating facts which indicate that the Court 
needs to compel the Respondents to perform an act which the law 
specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office. 
The Petitioners know or have reason to know that they can 
allege no facts in this regard that can support the issuance of 
this ex parte order. 
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Section 63-46b-12 (copy attached, Exhibit C) provides for 
agency review of administrative orders. In pertinent part, the 
section states: 
"If a statute or the agency's rules permit 
parties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek 
review of an order by the agency . . •, the 
aggrieved party may file a written request for 
review within thirty days . . ." 
This section also contemplates the filing of responsive 
pleadings, and allows the administrative forum to permit parties 
to file briefs, to conduct oral argument, and to have hearings on 
the matter* 
The Department of Commerce of the State of Utah has also 
promulgated a rule concerning agency review. Rule R151-46b-12 
of the Department (copy attached, Exhibit D) provides for the 
filing of a request for agency review and also for the filing of 
responsive pleadings. 
None of the foregoing contemplates that the agency will be 
reviewing orders which are "interlocutory" in nature, i.e., 
orders concerning the Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. The rules 
contemplate only the review of "final" agency orders. 
Petitioners have wished, in this action, to take what is, in 
essence, an interlocutory appeal to the agency itself when the 
administrative law judge rules against them. The procedure 
contemplated by the Petitioners in their request for review is 
erroneous and not in conformance with the commonly accepted 
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notion that an administrative forum is more summary in nature 
than are normal civil proceedings. 
Additionally, there is absolutely nothing contained in the 
Administrative Procedures Act, or in the Rules of the Department 
of Commerce which would provide a basis for this Court issuing an 
ex parte order requiring the Division to grant the Petitioner's 
request for agency review. Nor is there any portion of the 
Administrative Procedures Act, or the Rules of the Department of 
Business Regulation which provides a basis for this Court to 
grant Petitioner's ex parte order requiring the Respondents to 
certify the administrative law judge's interlocutory order as a 
"final agency action." 
The Petitioners simply are not entitled to take an appeal 
from an interlocutory order of an administrative law judge. This 
is born out in the case of Sloan v. Board of Review, 118 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 68 (October 2, 1989). In Sloan, the Utah Court of 
Appeals stated "an order of the agency is not final so long as it 
reserves something to the agency for further decision". Ici at 
68. In the Sloan case, the court dismissed an appeal due to the 
lack of a final agency order. 
Therefore, it has been the position of the Division, taken 
in its Order on agency review issued October 30, 1989, that the 
Petitioner's request for agency review was based on review of an 
order which was interlocutory in nature, not a final agency 
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action, and therefore was an inappropriate subject for agency 
review. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The Respondents respectfully request that the Court set 
aside its ex parte order, based on the fact that the Division has 
issued its order on agency review which specifies that the 
Petitioners had no basis for requesting review of the 
administrative law judge's order. Additionally, there appears no 
statutory authority for this Court to order the Respondents to 
grant the Petitioners' request for agency review or to certify as 
"final" the administrative law judge's order dated August 29, 
1989. 
It is respectfully requested that the order be set aside ex 
parte pursuant to Rule 7(b)(2) on the basis that Respondents had 
no notice of the original ex parte proceeding before this Court 
and petitioners will not be damaged in anyway if the order is set 
aside. 
DATED t h i s / ^ day of /vt&C€*~&~> , 1989. 
tIFFIN 
A t t o r n e y General 
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R. PAUL VAN DAM, #3312 
Attorney General 
Mark J. Griffin, #4329 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Petitioner 
115 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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REGISTRATION OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
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REQUEST FOR AGENCY REVIEW AND 
: HEARING. 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
REGISTRATION OF* 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
The Utah Securities Division, by and through its counsel, 
Mark J. Griffin, hereby submits this Brief in Reply to Request 
for Agency Review and Hearing thereon. This brief is submitted 
to the Division in compliance with Utah Code Ann. $63-46b-12(2). 
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It is urged that the Division not undertake a review of the 
Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order at this time for the reasons set forth out hereinafter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On March 1, 1989, the Division issued a Summary Order, 
case number SD-89-030, denying the availability of all 
transactional exemptions for the securities of U.S.A. Medical 
Corp., pursuant to the authority granted to the Division in 
Section 61-1-14(3) of the Act. A copy of the Summary Order was 
hand delivered to Johnson-Bowles on March 1, 1989. 
2. On March 1, 1989, the Division commenced an 
administrative action to deny the availability of all 
transactional exemptions from registration pursuant to Section 
61-1-14(3) of the Act for the securities of U.S.A. Medical Corp., 
case number SD-89-031. A copy of the Notice of Agency Action and 
Petition was mailed to Johnson-Bowles on March 2, 1989. 
3. On March 27, 1989, the Division issued Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Default Order denying the 
availability of the transactional exemptions from registration 
contained in Section 61-1-14(2) of the Act for the securities of 
U.S.A. Medical Corp. and any affiliates who are successors. A 
copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Default 
Order was mailed to Johnson-Bowles on March 27, 1989. 
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4. On March 31, 1989, the Division sent a letter to 
Johnson-Bowles restating the Division's Summary Order and Default 
Order. 
5. On or about April 3, 1989, through April 18, 1989, 
respondent Johnson, acting in his capacity as an agent and 
principal for Johnson-Bowles, attempted to affect or affected 
transactions in the securities of U.S.A. Medical Corp., which 
transactions are more accurately recorded at pages 4 and 5 of the 
Division's initial Petition in this matter. On April 27, 1989, 
the Division filed the instant action against Johnson-Bowles 
Company Inc. and Marlen Johnson requesting administration relief 
against the registration of the respondents under authority of 
Section 61-1-6(1)(b) and Section 61-1-6(1)(g). 
6. Upon motion, dated July 3, 1989, a oral argument was 
held on July 14, 1989 before the Administrative Law Judge in this 
matter• 
7. On August 29, 1989, the Administrative Law Judge 
entered an order denying the motion to dismiss. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Pages 3 through 11 of the Respondents' brief purport to 
contain statements of material fact. Many of these "statements" 
are statements of law. Many also contain mixed questions of law 
and fact and are argumentative in nature. While it is the 
contention of the Division that many of these "statements of 
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material fact" might well be disputed, a complete reply to all of 
the factual and legal and argumentative discrepancies is not the 
intent nor the aim of this brief. However, some of the points of 
law contained in this same section are so erroneous as to merit 
individual attention. Por example, at page 3, paragraph 1 of the 
statement of material facts, Respondents state "as members of the 
NASD, Respondents are required by law to obey its rules and 
regulations, including its rules of fair practice. 15 U.S.C. 
S78-o-3(b)(7)". However, 15 U.S.C. S78-o-3(b)(7) says no such 
thing. 15 U.S.C. §78-o-3(b) indicates that an association of 
brokers or dealers shall not be registered as a national 
securities association unless the Commission determines that the 
association meets the criteria listed in the section. Subsection 
3(b)(7), cited in Respondents' brief, is actually one of those 
criteria and reads as follows. 
"The rules of the association provide that...its 
members and persons associated with its members 
shall be appropriately disciplined for violation 
of...the rules of the association...." 
Therefore, the statement that Respondents are required by 
law to obey the rules and regulations of the NASD has no basis in 
the section cited in the United States Code. In fact, the 
obligation to adhere to the rules and regulations of the 
association is quite simply a function of the enforcement by the 
NASD of its own rules and regulations. The fact that the 
Securities Exchange Act requires that the registered national 
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association have rules which provide for the discipline of its 
members, does not lead to the conclusion that Respondents are 
required by law (i.e. the Securities Exchange Act) to obey the 
rules and regulations of the NASD. If there exists such a 
portion of the Securities Exchange Act which stands for the 
proposition espoused by the respondents it is certainly not found 
in 15 U.S.C. S78o-3(b)(7). 
At page 4, paragraph 2 counsel claims that it is -undisputed 
that obligations under the NASD and SEC rules and regulations are 
preempted under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 over which 
Federal Courts have exclusive jurisdiction." Assuming, that it 
was Respondents intent to indicate that it is the interpretation 
by state courts of the regulations of the NASD and the SEC which 
are preempted under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the 
statement nevertheless is still useless to the determination of 
the issues before the Division at this time. It is clearly not 
the intention of the Division to interpret or enforce the duties, 
liabilities or obligations of the Respondents under the NASD or 
SEC rules. The Division has brought this action, based on an 
allegation of dishonest and unethical conduct on the part of the 
respondents concerning the purchases of shares of U.S.A. Medical 
during the pendency of the Division's order which effectively 
suspends the availability of secondary trading exemptions for 
U.S.A. Medical stock. 
0013* 
Referring again to the errors in Respondents' "Statement of 
Pacts" it is beyond belief that the Respondents continue to cite 
to release number 34-7920 of the Securities Exchange Commission. 
It is a continuing example of Respondents' refusal to 
articulately address the legal and factual issues of this case. 
As the Division forcefully pointed out at the hearing on the 
Motion to Dismiss, release number 34-7920 has little to do with 
the facts of this case. First of all, the release is in the 
nature of a "no-action", or "safe harbor" for those brokers who, 
during a trading suspension, complete their agency or principal 
contracts entered into prior to the suspension order. A careful 
reading of the release would yield the conclusion that the 
release in no way covers the conduct of the Respondents, nor 
provides a basis for the Respondents to argue that the release 
entitles them to participate materially in the violation of Utah 
law. The release covers merely the completion of an agency or 
principal transactions. The example given by the release is "by 
payment or delivery." It does not go so far as to say that 
individuals may go out into the market place during the period of 
the suspension and acquire securities from the market place or 
from any source, for the purpose of effecting delivery in order 
to cover short sales. 
That concludes some observations concerning the most 
erroneous sections contained in Respondents' "Statements of 
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Facts." Since we urge the Division not to review the Order at 
this time, no effort is made here to point out the existence of 
less troubling or obvious error• 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Requested Review is of an Order Which is Not a 
Final Agency Order, andf Therefore, the Request Should be Denied. 
The Respondents' request is in the nature of an 
interlocutory appeal. The Administrative Procedures Act S63-46b-
1 et seq. is a relatively recent statute, and as such, there is 
very little case law available for the interpretation of the 
various provisions of the Act. It is the position of the 
Division that Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-12 and R151-46b-12, of the 
rules of the Department of Commerce, contemplate only the review 
of the final orders of the Division. Review of interlocutory 
matters would necessarily deprive the Administrative Law Forum of 
its native simplicity and speed, interposing levels of delay that 
were not contemplated by the framers of the Administrative 
Procedures Act, nor by the rules of the Department of Commerce, 
effectively interposing an interlocutory or secondary level of 
appeal. This level of complexity in an Administrative Forum, is 
highly undesirable and as such provides an ample basis for the 
denial of the Respondents' request. 
B. The Granting of a Request for Agency Review is a 
Discretionary Function of the Agency, and Bax^ncing the Interest 
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of the Party at this Stage of the Proceeding, the Division should 
Deny the Reguest. 
Utah Code Ann. $63-46b-12 and the corresponding rule of the 
Department of Commerce make the granting of a request for review 
a matter of discretion with the Division. The consideration of a 
grant of review would necessarily require a balancing of the 
interest of the parties at this stage of the proceeding. It is 
the belief of the Division that the likelihood of the success of 
the motion is considerably out weighed by the forum's interest in 
proceeding expeditiously to the merits of the case. Respondents 
are not prejudiced because they may still raise the issue in 
their memorandum on appeal of the Division's final order. 
C. The Arguments Pertaining to the "Non-Delegation 
Documents" and "Ultra Viresw Activity Were Not Raised in the 
Previous Hearing nor Briefed in the Memorandum Submitted 
Pursuant to the Motions to Dismissf and Therefore, Ought Not to 
be Reviewed at this Stage of the Proceeding. 
It is the best recollection of counsel for the Division that 
the matters raised by the respondents in their brief on pages 11-
19 concerning -Ultra Vires- activity by the Division and the 
doctrine of -non-delegation- were not raised in the previous 
hearing so that they could be addressed by the Administrative Law 
Judge. It is not in the best interest of the Forum to examine 
piece meal the theories that the Respondents may conjure up after 
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the fact. Therefore, the interest of the forum would require 
that the Division not review at this time new theories presented, 
but since those matters alleged pertain to a jurisdictional 
question these matters ought to be raised or combined with any 
appeal that the Respondents may file of the Division's final 
order. 
Setting aside the issue of whether the Division should 
exercise its discretion to review the interim order of the 
Administrative Law Judge, based on these new theories propounded 
by respondentsf and looking beyond at the merits of the arguments 
raised in Respondents' brief pertaining to the "non-delegation 
doctrine" and "Ultra Vires" activity by the Division, it is clear 
that the arguments of the Respondents' are merely 
misinterpretations of law. 
D. The Securities Division, in this action, is not seeking 
to enforce any duty or liability under the Federal Securities 
Exchange Act; therefore, no preemption issue arises. 
Counsel can plainly read that the Division's Petition cites 
two instances of dishonest and unethical conduct which are 
sanctioned under §6 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. Nowhere 
mentioned is the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Similarly 
Respondents have argued that this action is in conflict with the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Distilled to its finest 
elements, Respondents' preemption argument is that this 
coi?.« 
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proceeding is in conflict with the Rules of Fair Practice of the 
NASD, and, therefore, it is in conflict with the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. The Respondents cite to no provision of 
the Securities Exchange Act which endows the Rules of Fair 
Practice of the NASD with the force of law. Assuming, for the 
moment, that Respondents could demonstrate that such provision 
existed, Respondents would also be required to demonstrate that 
this action was in conflict with that law. This they cannot do. 
Respondents continually and disingenuously assert that 
Respondents were put in the position of disobeying state law or 
complying with the NASD rules of fair practice. The Division has 
repeatedly contended that such is not the case; that Respondents 
were pursuing a course of conduct which would necessarily involve 
a violation of state law on the part of another individual and 
that the primary justification for Respondents engaging in the 
conduct was monetary gain - not compliance with the NASD Rules of 
Fair Practice. Additionally, Respondents continually assert that 
the Rule of Fair Practice with which they were bound to comply is 
the rule regarding the honoring of outstanding contracts with 
other broker-dealers. The Division has repeatedly countered that 
the principal reason for the transaction engaged in by the 
Respondents was to remedy the firm's extensive problems with 
regard to its net capital which were called into question by the 
NASD when Respondents voluntarily engaged in short selling of 
U.S.A. Medical securities. Admittedly, the respondents have 
extensively briefed the issue of whether or not this proceeding 
is, in conflict with federal law and is therefore, preempted 
under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 
The vigor with which the Respondents have undertaken to continue 
to argue this point does not give credence to the Respondents' 
argument. The administrative law judge having had a complete 
opportunity to hear the arguments of both sides and read the 
briefs in connection therewith determined in the August 29th 
Order that "any necessary compliance by respondents with NASD 
rules is a member of that self-regulatory organization does not 
lend support to the conclusion that the Division lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction in this case." 
There is no basis for the Respondents' position that the 
rules of fair practice of the NASD supply a regulatory scheme of 
such a nature and extent that state regulation with regard to 
this proceeding is preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution. Additionally, counsel for the 
Division is familiar with the cases cited by Respondents in 
support of their contention that the Division's action gives rise 
to "dormant* commerce clause concerns. Counsel has not 
demonstrated in his brief, or in the hearing before the 
Administrative Law Judge, that there is any burden imposed 
interstate commerce as a result of this action. If such a burden 
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could be shown, that burden, under Edgar v, Mite Corp. 457 U.S. 
624 (1981) and Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), 
must be shown to outweigh the competing state interest in the 
institution of these proceedings. In reply to the "dormant" 
commerce clause argument, the Division would simply state that 
the interest of the state in containing the further distribution 
of U.S.A. Medical stock, in light of Judge Green's order, would 
significantly out weigh the Respondents' interest in complying 
with the rules of any self-regulatory organization. In the 
determination of the "dormant" commerce clause issue, the finder 
of fact would necessarily have to take into consideration the 
true motivation of the Respondents in acting as they did. 
Clearly, the financial motivation cannot be disregarded as the 
chief motivator in the Respondents determination to participate 
materially in violation of state law. Of course, the finder of 
fact may determine that compliance with the NASD regulations may 
have caused the Respondents serious financial hardship. However, 
the Respondents, and this is in accordance with the findings of 
Judge Green, were not altogether blameless for their financial 
situation. The Respondents cannot in good faith claim that the 
instant proceedings impose a significant burden on the gigantic 
and all encompassing interests of interstate commerce. The 
arguable impact of the instant proceedings is microscopic 
compared to the impact in Edgar and Bruce Church. In Edgar, the 
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U.S. Supreme Court grappled with the issue of whether a state's 
tender offer statute could preclude a nationwide tender offer. 
The court in Edgar was particularly concerned with the vast 
discretion that lay in the hands of the Illinois Secretary of 
State. The statute would allow the Secretary to effectively 
exercise that discretion to prohibit these vast tender offer 
transactions in interstate commerce. 
Pike v. Bruce Church dealt with the ability of a state to 
require fruit packing facilities to be built in Arizona and 
inhibited the interstate transportation of fruit which was not 
packaged within the boundaries of the state. Both those cases 
held that the state's various interests paled by comparison to 
the significant burdens the respective statutes imposed on 
interstate commerce. In this proceeding, however, the Division 
is dealing with the dishonest and unethical conduct on the part 
of two of its state licensees. No evidence has been introduced 
at hearing or in Respondents' memorandum and supporting documents 
to lead a finder of fact to reasonably conclude that there is any 
sizeable burden on interstate commerce threatened by the 
Division's action in this proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
Though there may have been a considerable financial burden 
upon the Respondents by the operation of the NASD Rules of Fair 
Practice and the net capital requirements of both state and 
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federal agencies, the risk of those financial burdens were 
voluntarily undertaken by the respondents when they engaged in 
short sales of the U.S.A. Medical Stock. Additionally, those 
financial burdens do not justify knowing and material 
participation in a violation of State law. It simply cannot be 
said that the effects of this proceeding reach beyond the 
Respondents into the vast arena of interstate commerce raising 
constitutional commerce clause issues. Nor have the Respondents 
shown a conflict with federal laws or regulatory schemes 
sufficient to provide a basis for preemption of this proceeding. 
It is urged that the Division rely upon the opinion of the 
Administrative Law Judge with respect to these issues and deny 
Respondents' request for review of these issues at this time, 
noting that the Respondents may raise these very same issues in 
any appeal of the Division's Final Order in this matter. 
Finally, the Respondents' Request for a Hearing in this 
matter will likely result in significant delay of this proceeding 
and, particularly in light of the insubstantial arguments 
supporting the Request for Review, such a hearing is not 
warranted on the issues presented. 
DATED this day of September, 1989. 
MARK J. GRIFFIN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson sent the just-stated letter to 
prompt the initiation of an NASD arbitration proceeding with 
respect to the dispute concerning the buy-in of U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation securities by Otra Clearing, Inc. 
9. On March 29, 1989, the Division's March 1, 1989 Summary 
Order was made permanent by default. Respondents received copies 
of the Division's March 1, 1989 and March 29, 1989 Orders on or 
about the date of their respective issuance. 
10. As of March 1, 1989, Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, 
Inc. owed several hundred thousand shares of U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation securities to several broker-dealers and clearing 
corporations. Sometime after the just-stated date, Respondents 
purchased a total of 397,900 shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
securities from six (6) Utah residents and one (1) New York 
resident. The Utah residents and the amount of shares so purchased 
were: Paul Jones (180,900), Nick Julian (69,500), Leo Pavich 
(67,500), Jim Coleman (30,000), Philip Tanzani (20,000) and Richard 
Sax (18,000). The New York resident was Sheldon Flateman (12,000). 
Respondents purchased U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities as the 
means to satisfy outstanding contracts for the delivery of those 
securities to several broker-dealers and clearing corporations. 
11. Prior to Respondents' purchase of U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation securities from the above-named seven individuals, 
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Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson informed Mr. Julian, Mr. Pavich, 
Mr. Coleman, Mr. Tanzani and Mr. Sax of the February 28, 1989 
ruling which had been entered by the Court in the previously-
referenced security fraud action and the March 1, 1989 and March 
29, 1989 Orders entered by the Division. Mr. Flateman and Mr. 
Jones, who were both registered NASD representatives, were also 
aware of the Federal Court ruling and the Division's Orders. Prior 
to March 1, 1989, Mr. Jones, a licensed securities agent with 
Wasatch Stock Trading, was involved with the trading of U.S.A. 
Medical Corporation securities. 
12. During April 1989, Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson was 
informed by a Karl Smith that a John Dawson had U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation securities which Mr. Smith believed Mr. Dawson was 
desirous of selling. Based on that information, Respondent Marlen 
Vernon Johnson contacted Mr. Dawson to determine if he was 
interested in selling those securities. No sale resulted and the 
conversation between Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson and Mr. 
Dawson did not constitute a violation of the Division's March 1989 
Order. Further, there is no sufficient evidence to find that 
Respondents or their agents solicited any of the above-named seven 
(7) individuals to sell their U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
securities. 
13. Given the price which Respondents sold U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation securities prior to entry of the March 1, 1989 Order 
and the subsequent price which Respondents paid the above-named 
seven (7) individuals to purchase said securities after March 1, 
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1989, Respondents realized a profit totalling $6,538 in that regard 
to thus deliver those securities to satisfy existing contracts with 
various broker-dealers and clearing corporations. 
14. On March 20, 1990, Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson 
purchased 54,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities 
from Mr. Sax. During the instant proceeding, Respondent testified 
that he purchased those securities for an entity known as the 
January Corporation as the means to possibly satisfy a pending NASD 
arbitration proceeding between Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, 
Inc. and Otra Clearing, Inc. regarding the March 1, 1989 buy-in of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities by Otra Clearing, Inc. On 
March 29, 1990 Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson - through the 
January Corporation - sold the 54,000 shares to a firm known as 
Sorenson, Chiddo & May. 
15. Sometime within the last two (2) months, Respondent 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. filed a Form BDW with the Division to 
request that its1 broker-dealer registration be withdrawn. Said 
request was denied, given the pending disciplinary proceeding as to 
that registration. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondents contend they did not engage in any dishonest or 
unethical conduct and that no disciplinary sanction should enter 
with regard to their registration as a securities broker-dealer and 
agent, respectively. Specifically, Respondents assert that: (1) 
the Division's March 1, 1989 Order prevented only the sale of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities; (2) Respondents purchased 
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those securities to satisfy existing contracts to thus deliver the 
securities to various broker-dealers and clearing corporations; and 
(3) Section 61-1-6(1)(g), Utah Code Ann. 1953 (as amended), quoted 
below, may not be applied to interfere with Respondents' attempts 
to honor their contractual obligations to such third parties. 
Respondents urge that the Division has taken no action against 
other individuals who may have participated in the purchase or sale 
of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities after entry of the March 
1, 1989 Order. Respondents also contend that the imposition of any 
sanction in this proceeding would be inconsistent with their duty 
to have complied with NASD requirements which prompted their 
purchase of the securities in order to avoid entry of a possible 
sanction with regard to their NASD affiliation. 
Section 61-1-6(1) provides as follows: 
"Upon approval by a majority of the Securities 
Advisory Board, the director...may issue an 
order. . .suspending, or revoking any 
registration,... if the director finds that it is in 
the public interest and if he finds...with respect 
to the. . .registrant or, in the case of a broker-
dealer..., any partner, officer, or director or any 
person occupying a similar status or performing 
similar functions, or any person directly or 
indirectly controlling the broker-dealer..., that 
such person: 
(g) engaged in dishonest or 
unethical practices in the 
securities business..." 
To be further noted is Section 61-1-7, which provides: 
"It is unlawful for any person to offer or 
sell any security in this state unless it is 
registered under this chapter or the security or 
transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14." 
The proper scope and operative effect of the March 1, 1989 Order 
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entered by the Division was to prohibit any trading of U.S.A. 
Medical Corporation securities within this state. Since those 
securities were neither registered nor exempt from registration and 
had been traded in a fraudulent scheme designed to manipulate the 
price of those securities, the just-stated order was duly entered 
to protect the public interest. It is specious to argue, as 
Respondents assert, that the order only prohibited the sale of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities. Given the unlawful issuance 
of those securities and that the subsequent trading of those 
securities was tainted by fraudulent and manipulative practices, 
the proper scope of the March 1, 1989 Order must be broadly 
interpreted and in a manner consistent with the purpose for the 
issuance of that order. 
Concededly, Respondents had an existing contractual obligation 
to deliver U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities to various broker-
dealers and clearing corporations prior to the entry of the March 
1, 1989 Order. It is obvious that Respondents elected to trade in 
the securities at issue in an effort to mitigate their "short" 
position, avoid potentially severe economic consequences and escape 
the entry of a possible sanction on their NASD membership. Under 
the circumstances, no other alternative existed to thus foster 
Respondents' economic interests and the motivation for their 
conduct is clearly understandable. 
Nevertheless, Respondents purchased U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
securities after March 1, 1989 with knowledge that a sale of those 
securities would constitute a violation of the March 1, 1989 Order. 
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Such conduct clearly constitutes a "dishonest or unethical 
practice" within the meaning of Section 61-1-6(1)(g) and provides 
a sufficient basis upon which to enter a disciplinary sanction as 
to Respondents' registration. 
Regardless of the factors which prompted Respondents purchase 
of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities, that conduct frustrated 
the Division's appropriate efforts to preclude trading in those 
securities and thus partially emasculated the effect of the March 
1, 1989 Order. While the record does not identify when Respondents 
purchased U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities after March 1, 
1989, any delay between entry of the March 1, 1989 Order and 
Respondents' subsequent purchase of the securities appears to be 
more reflective of the common knowledge that the price of those 
securities would decrease after entry of the March l, 1989 Order 
rather than any intended compliance by Respondents with that order. 
Respondents' contention that the Division has engaged in 
selective enforcement of the March 1, 1989 Order lacks serious 
merit. The Board notes that a disciplinary proceeding has been 
initiated as to Mr. Jones. It is unknown whether any disciplinary 
proceeding may be subsequently initiated as to Otra Clearing, Inc., 
P.B. Jameson, R.A. Johnson or any of their agents with regard to 
the buy-in notice issued to Respondents by Otra Clearing, Inc. In 
any event, the fact remains that Respondents engaged in misconduct 
which subjects them to entry of a disciplinary sanction regardless 
of whether other proceedings are initiated by the Division as to 
other entities or individuals. 
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Given the circumstances of this case, it may well have been 
impossible for Respondents to have either satisfied their existing 
contractual obligations to various broker-dealers and clearing 
corporations and avoid the subsequent entry of a disciplinary 
sanction in the proceeding or to have scrupulously avoided trading 
in U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities and escape possible action 
on their NASD membership. However, the existence of that dilemma 
does not support Respondents1 assertions that their duty to comply 
with the March 1, 1989 Order was inferior and subordinate to their 
satisfaction of any NASD requirements and that no disciplinary 
sanction can enter in this forum because they could have been 
potentially subject to adverse NASD action if they did not satisfy 
their contractual obligations to third parties. 
Concededly, there is no evidence that Respondents1 violation 
of the March 1, 1989 Order resulted in any harm to the investing 
public. Nevertheless, entry of a disciplinary sanction in this 
proceeding is in the public interest and clearly warranted due to 
Respondents1 non-compliance with the March 1, 1989 Order which was 
duly entered to regulate the trading of U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
securities. The record reflects that Respondents' dishonest and 
unethical conduct was driven by a desire to realize monetary gain 
and/or avoid financial loss and that Respondents' willingness to 
engage in trading the securities shifted over time, depending upon 
whatever would promote Respondents' economic interests. Adherence 
to orders duly entered by the Division which govern the practices 
of broker-dealers and agents engaged in the securities business 
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should not be a matter dictated by the potential for monetary gain. 
By reason of the serious nature of Respondents' misconduct, an 
appropriately severe sanction should be entered. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the registration of Respondent 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. as a broker-dealer in the State of 
Utah and the registration of Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson as an 
agent in this state shall be suspended for one (1) year. 
It is further ordered that said suspensions shall be deemed 
retroactively effective from the date that Respondent Johnson-
Bowles Company, Inc. filed its1 Form BD.W with the Division of 
Securities. 
It is further ordered that, upon expiration of the period of 
suspension set forth above, Respondents1 registration shall be 
placed on probation for two (2) years. Should Respondents fail to 
comply with the statutes and rules which govern their registration 
during that time, further proceedings shall be conducted and a 
determination made whether a sanction of greater severity than that 
set forth herein is warranted. 
Dated this I C A M day of August, 1990. 





BY THE DIRECTOR: 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
are hereby approved. Said Order shall become effective thirty (30) 
days from the date set forth below. 
Dated this day of August, 1990. 
^John C. Baldwin 
Director 
Administrative Review of this Order may be obtained by filing 
a Request for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of 
this Order. Any request for a review shall comply with the 
requirements set forth in Sections 61-1-23, 63-46b-12(l) and the 
departmental rules which govern agency review. 
Judicial Review of this Order may be obtained by filing a 
Petition for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of 
this Order. Any petition for such Review shall comply with the 
requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-16. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have this day hand-delivered the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order properly 
addressed to: Mark J. Griffin, Assistant Attorney General for the 
Division of Securities at Tax & Business Regulation Division, 130 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; Kathleen C. McGinley, 
Director, Broker/Dealer Section, Division of Securities, Department 
of Commerce; Steven J. Eklund, Administrative Law Judge, Department 
of Commerce; John Michael Coombs, 72 East 400 South, Suite 220, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and mailed postage prepaid to: Craig F. 
McCullough, Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 8th Floor, Kennecott 
Building, 10 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84113, co-
counsel for Respondents. 
Dated this /3C^ day of August, 1990^ 
" 'A 
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